On the privacy offered by (k,δ)-anonymity by Trujillo Rasua, Rolando & Domingo-Ferrer, Josep
On the Privacy Offered by (k, δ)-Anonymity
Rolando Trujillo-Rasua and Josep Domingo-Ferrer
Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Department of Computer Engineering and Mathematics
UNESCO Chair in Data Privacy
Av. Pa¨ısos Catalans 26
E-43007 Tarragona, Catalonia
{rolando.trujillo, josep.domingo}@urv.cat
Abstract
The widespread deployment of technologies with tracking capabilities, like GPS,
GSM, RFID and on-line social networks, allows mass collection of spatio-temporal
data about their users. As a consequence, several methods aimed at anonymizing
spatio-temporal data before their publication have been proposed in recent years.
Such methods are based on a number of underlying privacy models. Among these
models, (k, δ)-anonymity claims to extend the widely used k-anonymity concept by
exploiting the spatial uncertainty δ ≥ 0 in the trajectory recording process. In this
article, we prove that, for any δ > 0 (that is, whenever there is actual uncertainty),
(k, δ)-anonymity does not offer trajectory k-anonymity, that is, it does not hide an
original trajectory in a set of k indistinguishable anonymized trajectories. Hence, the
methods based on (k, δ)-anonymity, like Never Walk Alone (NWA) and Wait For Me
(W4M) can offer trajectory k-anonymity only when δ = 0 (no uncertainty). Thus,
the idea of exploiting the recording uncertainty δ to achieve trajectory k-anonymity
with information loss inversely proportional to δ turns out to be flawed.
Key words: Spatio-temporal data, Trajectory, Data privacy, Anonymity,
Uncertainty.
1 Introduction
The exponential growth of computational power, storage capabilities and telecom-
munication and wireless technologies expedites the collection of user-specific
data. The true value of these data lies in their analytical usefulness, which
means they should be eventually released to researchers and/or analysts.
Therefore, data holders face the challenge of releasing information without
compromising the privacy of their users.
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In 1998, Samarati and Sweeney [1] proposed a novel formal model named k-
anonymity for measuring the privacy of a released microdata set, that is, a
collection of records corresponding to individual respondents. The idea is to
focus on the set of attributes that can potentially appear also in other publicly
available datasets that contain identifiers (e.g. electoral rolls, phonebooks,
etc.). This set of attributes are called quasi-identifiers. If each combination of
values of quasi-identifier attributes is shared by at least k records, k-anonymity
holds. In this case, the probability of re-identifying a respondent by linking
with external identified data sets is at most 1/k.
The popularity of k-anonymity has led to extensions for specific types of data,
like spatio-temporal data. One of these extensions is (k, δ)-anonymity [2,3],
which is specifically designed for uncertain trajectories defined as the move-
ment of an object on the surface of the Earth. In this privacy notion, parameter
k has the same meaning as in k-anonymity, while δ represents a lower bound
of the uncertainty radius when recording the locations of trajectories. To the
best of our knowledge, two anonymization methods named Never Walk Alone
(NWA, [2]) and Wait for Me (W4M, [3]), aimed at achieving (k, δ)-anonymity,
have been proposed up to date.
1.1 Contribution and plan of this paper
In this article, we analyze the privacy offered by (k, δ)-anonymity and we
prove that it does not offer trajectory k-anonymity when δ > 0, that is,
when there is actual uncertainty. Our proof is based on a formal definition of
trajectory k-anonymity as indistinguishability within a set of k anonymized
trajectories. A direct implication of this result is that the two methods NWA
and W4M can offer trajectory k-anonymity only when δ = 0 (when there is
no uncertainty). Hence, the recording uncertainty δ cannot be exploited to
reach trajectory k-anonymity with information loss inversely proportional to
δ (which was precisely the aim of (k, δ)-anonymity).
Section 2 recalls (k, δ)-anonymity. Section 3 analyzes the privacy provided by
(k, δ)-anonymity and shows that it does not offer trajectory k-anonymity for
δ > 0. Section 4 is a conclusion.
2 (k, δ)-Anonymity
The (k, δ)-anonymity privacy notion is based on the assumption that trajecto-
ries are imprecise by nature. Unlike records in traditional databases, trajectory
data do not remain constant over time, because a moving object should report
2
its position in real-time. However, this is impractical due to performance and
wireless-bandwidth overhead. For this reason, Trajcevski et al. [4] suggest that
a moving object and the server should reach an agreement consisting on an
uncertainty threshold δ, meaning that a position is reported only when it devi-
ates from its expected location by δ or more. Considering so, a moving object
does not draw a trajectory anymore, but an uncertain trajectory defined by a
trajectory τ and an uncertainty threshold δ.
Definition 1 (Trajectory) A trajectory is an ordered set of time-stamped
locations
τ = {(t1, x1, y1), . . . , (tn, xn, yn)} ,
where ti < ti+1 for all 1 ≤ i < n.
Notation. For any time-stamp t1 ≤ t ≤ tn, the function τ(t) outputs the
location of τ at time t. If t = ti for some i ∈ {1, · · · , n} then τ(t) = (xi, yi),
otherwise τ(t) is the linear interpolation of the poly-line τ at time t. Similarly,
τ(t)[x] and τ(t)[y] denote the spatial coordinates of the location τ(t).
Definition 2 (Uncertain trajectory) An uncertain trajectory is a pair (τ, δ)
where τ is a trajectory and δ is an uncertainty threshold. Geometrically, the
uncertain trajectory is defined as the locus
UT (τ, δ) = {(t, x, y)|d((x, y), (τ(t)[x], τ(t)[y])) ≤ δ} ,
where d((x1, y1), (x2, y2)) represents the Euclidean distance between the loca-
tions (x1, y1) and (x2, y2).
As shown in Figure 1, an uncertain trajectory UT (τ, δ) is the union of all the
cylinders of radius δ centered in the lines formed by (xi, yi) and (xi+1, yi+1) for
every 1 ≤ i < n. Then, any continuous function PMCτ : [t1, tn] → R2 such
that PMCτ ([t1, tn]) ⊂ UT (τ, δ) is said to be a possible motion curve of the
uncertain trajectory UT (τ, δ).
t
x
y
δ
Possible Motion Curve τ
Fig. 1. A trajectory τ and its uncertain trajectory UT (τ, δ). A possible motion curve
within UT (τ, δ) is also shown.
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If a trajectory τ1 is a possible motion curve of the uncertain version (τ2, δ) of
another trajectory τ2 and viceversa (τ2 is a possible motion curve of (τ1, δ)),
then τ1 and τ2 are said to be co-localized with respect to δ [2,3]. This relation is
denoted as Colocδ(τ1, τ2) and provides the rationale behind (k, δ)-anonymity.
Definition 3 ((k, δ)-anonymity set) Given an uncertainty threshold δ, a
set of trajectories S is considered an anonymity set if and only if Colocδ(τi, τj) ∀τi, τj ∈
S.
Then, (k, δ)-anonymity is defined as follows in [2,3]:
Definition 4 ((k, δ)-anonymity) Given a database of trajectories D, an un-
certainty threshold δ, and an anonymity threshold k, (k, δ)-anonymity is sat-
isfied if, for every trajectory τ ∈ D, there exists a (k, δ)-anonymity set S ⊆ D
such that τ ∈ S and |S| ≥ k.
3 Privacy analysis of (k, δ)-anonymity
The concept of k-anonymity [1] is built upon the definition of quasi-identifier.
However, there is no agreement yet about how quasi-identifiers can be defined
in spatio-temporal data. Potentially, every location could be regarded as a
quasi-identifier [5]. For this reason, some extensions of k-anonymity to spatio-
temporal data [6–8] do not consider quasi-identifiers at all and are aimed
at releasing groups of k indistinguishable trajectories independently of the
adversary’s knowledge. (k, δ)-Anonymity [2,3] is also based on this worst case.
Let us use the formalization of this notion of trajectory k-anonymity given
in [6].
Definition 5 (Trajectory k-anonymity) Let T ∗ be an anonymized set of
trajectories corresponding to an original set of trajectories T . Let Prτ∗ [τ |σ]
denote the probability of the adversary’s correctly linking the anonymized tra-
jectory τ ∗ ∈ T ∗ with its corresponding original trajectory τ ∈ T given that
the adversary’s knows a strict subset σ of the locations of τ . Then T ∗ satisfies
trajectory k-anonymity if Prτ∗ [τ |σ] ≤ 1/k for every τ ∈ T and σ subset of the
locations of τ .
In Definition 5 above, the adversary’s knowledge is represented as a sub-
trajectory of an original trajectory, that is, as a subset of the set of time-
stamped locations of the original trajectory. This background knowledge repre-
sentation is appropriate for the trajectory anonymization schemes [6–8]. How-
ever, the uncertainty on the data under (k, δ)-anonymity does not permit to
assume that the adversary knows a sub-trajectory in the above sense, except
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when δ = 0 (no uncertainty). For δ > 0, the adversary at best could know
a possible motion curve PMCτ of a trajectory τ contained in the original
database D. In other words, the adversary cannot be sure that her knowledge
PMCτ is exactly what was recorded in D. It should be remarked that the
adversary’s knowledge was not explicitly defined in [2] or [3]. However, it is
required in this article in order to provide formal privacy proofs.
Definition 6 The adversary’s knowledge in a database D of uncertain trajec-
tories is defined as a random possible motion curve PMCτ of some trajectory
τ ∈ D.
Definition 6 can be seen the other way round: the adversary is assumed to
have the ability to acquire true actual locations about a user, such as home
address or visited places, but the locations recorded in the database form a
random possible motion curve of the adversary’s knowledge due to the location
uncertainty δ. Note that not considering the recorded trajectory as a random
possible motion curve of the true original trajectory contradicts the (k, δ)-
anonymity concept.
Theorem 1 Let D be a database satisfying (k, δ)-anonymity. In general, D
does not satisfy trajectory k-anonymity for any δ > 0.
Proof: We first give a counterexample which satisfies (2, δ)-anonymity for
any δ > 0 but does not satisfy trajectory 2-anonymity; we will then gener-
alize the argument for any k. Let τ1 and τ2 be two different but co-localized
trajectories w.r.t. δ such that each of them consists of a single location. By
the co-localization condition, the time stamp of both locations is the same
and the distance d between the spatial coordinates of both locations satisfies
0 < d ≤ δ.
Let D be the original dataset containing τ1 and τ2 only. Let us provide the ad-
versary with a random possible motion curve PMCτi where i ∈R {1, 2} is ran-
domly chosen. According to Definition 5, trajectory 2-anonymity is achieved
if the adversary cannot guess with probability greater than 1
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whether i = 1
or i = 2.
However, let us consider the following adversarial strategy:
(1) The adversary computes d(PMCτi , τ1) and d(PMCτi , τ2).
(2) If d(PMCτi , τ1) < d(PMCτi , τ2), the adversary’s guess i = 1; otherwise,
the adversary’s guess is i = 2.
Now we will show that the previous strategy achieves a probability of success
greater than 1
2
. To that end, let us compute the probability that d(PMCτ1 , τ1) ≥
d(PMCτ1 , τ2) for a random PMCτ1 .
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Let A and B the two points of intersection of the uncertainty circles of τ1
and τ2 (see Figure 2). Then, d(PMCτ1 , τ1) ≥ d(PMCτ1 , τ2) only holds when
PMCτ1 lies in the arc segment area formed by the points A, B, and the
uncertainty circle of τ1 (shaded area in Figure 2). Since the line AB intersects
the line formed by τ1 and τ2 in its middle point, it can be concluded that
0 ≤ d(A,B) < 2δ. As d(A,B) grows towards 2δ, the aforementioned arc
segment area becomes asymptotically close to its maximum value piδ2/2. This
means that:
τ1
τ2
d/2
δ
d/2
δ
A
B
Fig. 2. Two trajectories τ1 and τ2 of size 1 such that d(τ1, τ2) = d ≤ δ. The two
circles that intersect at A and B represent the uncertainty areas of both trajectories
according to Definition 2.
Pr(d(PMCτ1 , τ1) ≥ d(PMCτ1 , τ2)) <
1
2
. (1)
From Expression (1), it can be concluded that the adversary’s success proba-
bility is always greater than 1
2
for any δ > 0, which contradicts 2-anonymity.
The above reasoning can be generalized to any number k of trajectories. The
generalized adversarial strategy is:
(1) The adversary computes d(PMCτi , τj) for all j ∈ {1, · · · , k}.
(2) The adversary’s guess is trajectory τg such that
g = arg min1≤j≤kd(PMCτi , τj)
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By generalizing the geometric argument of Figure 2, it can be seen that the
adversary’s success probability with the above strategy is greater than 1
k
. This
contradicts trajectory k-anonymity for any k and δ. 2
Corollary 1 The methods NWA [2] and W4M [3] can only offer trajectory
k-anonymity for δ = 0, that is, when all k trajectories in any (k, δ)-anonymity
set are identical. In other words, trajectory k-anonymity is offered only when
the set of anonymized trajectories consists of clusters containing k or more
identical trajectories each.
4 Conclusions
We have shown that, in general, (k, δ)-anonymity does not offer trajectory
k-anonymity for any δ > 0. It only offers this property for δ = 0, that is,
when the set of anonymized trajectories consists of clusters containing k or
more identical trajectories each. In this situation, the uncertainty of trajec-
tory recording is no longer exploited and a high information loss in incurred:
a cluster of k original trajectories are replaced by k identical anonymized
trajectories.
We conclude that the idea of exploiting the recording uncertainty δ to achieve
trajectory k-anonymity with information loss inversely proportional to δ turns
out to be flawed.
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